Cases

An elderly woman executed a durable power of attorney to her daughter in law before moving into a nursing home. The daughter in law signed the admission documents, which included an arbitration agreement, using that authority. The elderly woman died in the nursing home, and the personal representative of her estate brought suit. The trial court ruled that the daughter in law’s actions in agreeing to the arbitration clause were not sufficient to compel arbitration. The district court reversed holding that a catch-all provision in the power of attorney agreement in this case gave the daughter in law broad powers that granted her the authority to consent to such agreements.

The district court granted the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. The plaintiff argued that the underlying agreement, which included an arbitration clause, was unconscionable. The district court, however, held that any question about the validity of the contract as a whole, and not the arbitration clause specifically, must be decided by the arbitrator. The district court also held that the plaintiff’s claims of interference with a contractual relationship and defamation were arbitrable and that all claims were foreseeable at the time the contract was entered into.

A corporation claimed that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.S. § 2, should have applied to a suit brought against it by a physician alleging 12 counts, including, among others, monopolization of the hospital market, restraint of trade, unfair competition, and tortious interference with business relationships. The corporation argued that the Act applied because a participating group agreement (“agreement”) entered into by the physician encompassed the treatment of Medicare patients, thus satisfying the Act’s interstate commerce requirement. The appellate court, however, found that no evidence was presented regarding the receipt of payments from Medicare. The trial court properly found that there was no nexus between the allegations in the first six counts of the complaint and the agreement. The agreement was only mentioned by the doctor as an example of the corporation's anti-competitive, deceptive, and monopolistic behaviors. Other claims of misconduct contained in those counts were based on common law or public policy. These claims did not set forth a nexus between the doctor and the agreement and in turn, no claims involving interstate commerce. The next five counts, alleging violations of § 501.204(1), Fla. Stat., were brought as potential class actions on behalf of certain specific employers. As the trial court found, the agreement was only one example of the corporation's alleged violation of the statute. None of these allegations demonstrated a nexus between the doctor and the agreement. Therefore, the agreement could not be utilized to trigger arbitration.